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La Cour des petites créances a une longue histoire dans le domaine du recouvrement de 
dettes et une image populaire en tant que « cour du peuple ». Cet article examine sa 
fonction émergeante et peu connue comme forum où des questions sociales urgentes sont 
entendues et où la politique sociale est mise en œuvre sur le terrain. La Cour des petites 
créances de l’Ontario est l’une de ces cours qui a récemment obtenu un mandat de 
politique sociale. Au cours des quinze dernières années, l’Assemblée législative et la 
Cour d’appel de l’Ontario ont directement ou indirectement donné à la Cour des petites 
créances la nouvelle responsabilité de mettre en œuvre une politique sociale moderne 
dans les domaines de la supervision des enfants, de la discrimination et de la protection 
de la vie privée. Cet article examine l’étendue de cette nouvelle responsabilité et 
considère certains des défis liés au fait d’adapter ce processus simplifié au nouveau 
mandat. 
 
Small Claims Court has a long history in debt collection and a popular image as the 
“People’s Court.” This article examines a little known emerging function as a forum 
where pressing social issues are given voice and social policy is implemented on the 
grassroots level. The Ontario Small Claims Court is a recent recipient of this social 
policy mandate. Over the past fifteen years, the Ontario Legislature and Court of Appeal 
have directly or indirectly given the Small Claims Court new responsibility for 
implementing modern social policy in the areas of child supervision, discrimination, and 
privacy. This article examines the scope of the new responsibility and considers some of 
the challenges faced in adapting this simplified process to the new mandate. 
 
TWO DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF SMALL CLAIMS COURT are regularly 
debated in academic literature and the public forum. In one view, small claims court is the 
“People’s Court” where personal, small valued disputes are quickly and informally resolved 
without the need for legal representation;
1
 in the other, the court is a debt collection agency 
where businesses routinely turn bad debts into uncontested judgments and individuals rarely 
                                                 
*
 Professor, Business Law, Lazaridis School of Business & Economics, Wilfrid  Laurier University; Deputy Judge, 
Ontario Small Claims Court – Central South.   
1
 See e.g. Crouchman v El Dorado Investors, (1988) 45 Cal 3d 1167 at 1175-1177(Cal S C) [Crouchman]; Gerald 
Lebovits, “Small Claims Courts Offer Prompt Adjudication Based on Substantive Law” (1998) 70(8) NY St Bar J 6 
at 8 (noting business claims were processed in a separate commercial claims court in New York State); Tal Finney 
& Joel Yanovich, “Expanding Justice Through the “People’s Court”” (2006) 39 Loy LA L Rev 769 at 773; 
Christopher S Axworthy, “Controlling the Abuse of Small Claims Court” (1976) McGill LJ 480 at 480–81. 
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participate as anything other than defendants.
2
 In practice, the court usually performs both of 
these contrasting functions and much has been written about how to strike the appropriate 
balance between the two.
3
  
The forgoing characterizations of small claims court share a common misconception: that  
small claims court deals with only uncomplicated, routine, and insignificant issues.
4
 This is not 
the case.
5
 In its third, little known, and somewhat surprising, function, the small claims court can 
be a vehicle for social change—a forum where pressing social issues are given voice and social 
policy is implemented on the grassroots level. The Ontario Small Claims Court hosts this 
expanding and under-acknowledged function. Over the last fifteen years important new legal 
rights have been given access to Ontario’s most accessible and informal public process. Both the 
Ontario Legislature and Court of Appeal have directly or indirectly given small claims court new 
social policy responsibilities for developing substantive standards of behaviour not yet addressed 
in other courts.  
As an introduction to the social policy function of small claims court, this paper reports 
on the Ontario Small Claims Court’s jurisdiction over three pressing social issues: parental 
responsibility, discrimination, and privacy. In 2000, the Ontario Small Claims Court became an 
arbiter of satisfactory child supervision with the enactment of the Parental Responsibility Act, 
2000.
6
 Next, the court took on human rights and discrimination disputes following the end of the 
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal’s monopoly in 2006. Most recently, in 2012, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal positioned small claims court to take the lead in the development of Ontario’s new 
common law privacy torts. The court’s limited monetary jurisdiction
7
 and reduced evidentiary 
requirements
8
 make it an accessible forum for the practical application of social policy where the 
                                                 
2
 See e.g. Christopher R Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, “Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court” (2011) 7 
Hastings Bus LJ 77 at 80–81; “Spotlight, Debtors’ Hell, Part 2: A Court System Compromised,” The Boston Globe 
(31 July 2006), online: < archive.boston.com/news/specials/debt/> [https://perma.cc/PZ6F-HEFH] (concluding that 
smalls claims courts have mutated into a system that ignores individual rights and shows favouritism toward debt 
collectors and their lawyers); Finney & Yanovich, supra note 1 at 776–777; Terence G Ison, “Small Claims” (1972) 
35 Modern L Rev 18 at 18; Axworthy, supra note 1 at 482. 
3
 See e.g. Iain Ramsay, “Small Claims Court: A Review,” Rethinking Civil Justice: Research Studies for the Civil 
Justice System, vol 2 (Ontario Law Reform Commission: Toronto, 1996) at 489–544; John Baldwin, “Is There a 
Limit to Expansion of Small Claims?” (2003) 56 Curr Legal Prob 313 at 335–336; Peter Finkle & David Cohen, 
“Consumer Redress Through Alternative Dispute Resolution and Small Claims Court” (1993) 13 Windsor YB 
Access Just 81 at 102–105; Shelley McGill, “Small Claims Court Identity Crisis: A Review of Recent Reform 
Measures,” (2010) 49 Can Bus LJ 213 at 219–222; Axworthy, supra note 1. 
4
 Ramsay, supra note 3 at 500. 
5
 Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Review of the Small Claims Court (Winnipeg: Law Reform Commission, 
March 1998)) at 31, online: <manitobalawreform.ca/pubs/pdf/archives/99-full_report.pdf> [perma.cc/RR72-CM76], 
stating “there is nothing inherent in the nature of small claims courts that restricts them to hearing simple or non-
complicated matters,” citing Royal Insurance Co of Canada v Legge (1996), 36 CCLI (2d) 210 (NSSC), Stockey v 
Peel Condominium Corp No 174 (1996), 30 OR (3d) 464 (On Div Ct). 
6
 SO 2000, c 4, s 2(1). 
7
 Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, s 23 (monetary damages up to $25,000 and transfer of property, no 
equitable relief). 
8
 Ibid at ss 25, 27; Grover v Hodgins, 2011 ONCA 72 at para 47 [Grover] (acknowledging summary trial and 
relaxed rules of evidence); Smith v Galin, [1956] OWN 432 at 434 (ONCA) (stating that the court is not entitled to 
disregard principles of law but may “disregard technical defects which would defeat the justice of the claim”). 
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underlying principle is of great societal importance but damages are minor or difficult to assess. 
Naturally, there are challenges, such as limited discovery and few reported decisions, which may 
limit the court’s social policy impact. Most notably among these challenges is the inability to 
grant equitable relief. In Ontario equitable remedies remain outside the scope of the court’s 
authority
9
 and therefore the ability to force immediate behaviour modification is not within the 
court’s power. 
To begin, Part I of this paper looks at the evolution of Small Claims Court from its 
origins in debt collection to its reformation as the “People’s Court” and the resulting 
trivialization of the Court’s function by the media. Part II highlights the social policy mandate of 
Ontario’s court by focusing on three new social civil causes of action added to the existing list of 
Small Claims Court responsibilities. Part III of the paper examines potential challenges for the 
court and its litigants as they process social change litigation within the simplified system. The 
paper concludes by recommending an expansion of the range of available remedies. 
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SMALL CLAIMS COURT  
 
The pendulum in small claims court design priorities seems to swing back and forth between 
debt collection and procedural access to justice functions. For decades, system designers have 
justified reform measures as furthering one or the other of these two functions and commentators 
have examined the performance of the court from only these two lenses.
10
 However, over the last 
fifteen years of the Ontario court’s history its little known social policy dimension has been 
expanded, adding to its already complex mandate.
11
 So far, academic literature has paid little 
attention to this growing and potentially revolutionizing social policy dimension.  
 
  
                                                 
9
 Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43 ss 23, 96(3); Moore v Canadian Newspapers Co. (1989) 69 OR (2d) 262; 
Grover, supra note 8 at paras 44, 47.  
10
 See e.g. British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General, 2005/06 Annual Service Plan Report:: Highlights of the 
Yearonline: < bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/annual_reports/2005_2006/ag/Highlights_of_the_Year.htm> [perma.cc/44L3-
PWK4]; Ontario Ministry of Attorney General, Small Claims Court, Increase in monetary limit from $10,000 to 
$25,000, online: <attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/scc/scc_increase_limit.php> [perma.cc/R2A8-
SSSK]; John C Ruhnka et al, Small Claims Courts: A National Examination (National Center for State Courts, 1978) 
at 161–69 online: <contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/civil&CISOPTR=0> 
[perma.cc/7ME5-78QP]; George Adams, “The Small Claims Court and the Adversary Process: More Problems of 
Function and Form” (1973) 51 Can Bar Rev 583 at 608–09 (as to Canadian courts); Iain Ramsay, “Lowered 
Horizons and Broadened Vistas: The Small Claims Court and Access to Justice,” Book Review of Small Claims in 
the County Courts in England and Wales by John Baldwin, (1998) 25 JL & Soc’y 438 at 441–2; Jacob Ziegel, 
“Canadian Consumer Law and Policies 40 Years Later: A Mixed Report Card” (2011) 50 Can Bus LJ 259 at 291–92 
(lamenting the failure to serve consumers). 
11
 Nuisance and defamation causes of action (already part of the Ontario Court’s jurisdiction although excluded from 
other jurisdictions such as British Columbia) could be considered behaviour modification actions. One distinction 
would be that foundational principles defining these torts have been established in superior courts and merely 
applied by the small claims court. Privacy and parental supervision standards are being formed in small claims court.  
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A. FROM DEBT COLLECTION TO PEOPLE’S COURT 
  
The Ontario Small Claims Court began with a distinctly economic purpose. The Court of 
Requests, formed in 1792, was specifically designed for debt collection purposes, as aptly 
reflected in the name of the legislation—An act for the more easy and speedy recovery of small 
debts.
12
 Like other North American small claims courts,
13
 it evolved from the British “Debtor’s 
Court” of 1606 to provide the emerging mercantile class with a cost effective manner to collect 
outstanding accounts.
14
 Committing non-paying debtors to goal was a regular occurrence. Debt 
collection remained the court’s sole purpose even when Ontario changed the court’s name to the 
Division Court in the 19
th
 century and well into the 20
th
 century when complaints about its 
cumbersome, expensive process and debtor’s prison triggered calls for change.
15
 
In the 1960s and 70s consumer advocacy was in the air and that fresh breeze swept 
through small claims court.
16
 Despite its long debt collection history, criticism of small claims 
court focused on overuse by business, as businesses were suing predominantly individual 
defendants who rarely defended.
17
 Historically, there was fear that easy informal debt collection 
was leading to questionable business practices in the marketplace and in the court.
18
 Empowering 
the consumer against big business became the priority after the Royal Commission of Inquiry 
into Civil Rights berated the court as “a debt-collection agency with draconian powers.”
19
 
Attention of policymakers shifted from aiding business to empowering consumers and creating a 
user friendly forum for individuals became the priority. Ontario was not alone; by the 1970’s 
most jurisdictions were reinventing their small claims courts’ missions to focus on access to 
justice for everyday people, to restrict harsh remedies, and to remove the barrier that expensive 
legal fees were building.
20
 System design reflected the new mission. 
                                                 
12
 Grover, supra note 8 at para 46; An act for the more easy and speedy recovery of small debts, LL UC 1792 (32 
GeoG III), c 6.  
13
 John Montague Steadman & Richard Rosenstein, “‘Small Claims’ Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia 
Municipal Court: an Empirical Study” (1973) 121:2 U Paa L Rev 1309 at note 1 (acknowledging US courts stem 
from old English courts and earliest configurations were in 1600s); Judith Fox, “Do We Have a Debt Collection 
Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana” (2012) 24 Loy Consumer L Rev 355 at 367 
(describing the Indiana Court’s creation in 1799); Crouchman, supra note 1 at 1079–81 (connecting California’s 
court to the English Debtor’s Court of 1606). 
14
 Jill Gross, “AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration” (2012) 42 Sww L Rev 47 at 56–57 
(citing Roscoe Pound, “The Administration of Justice in the Modern City” (1913) 26 Harv L Rev 302 at 315).  
15
 Ramsay, supra note 3 at 493-497. 
16
 Gross, supra note 14 at 58. 
17
 Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, “Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of Small Claims 
Literature” (1975) 9:2 Law & Soc’y’ Rev 219 at 229. 
18
 Ison, supra note 2 at 18 (describing perjured affidavits of service); Ramsay, supra note 3 at 493 (complaints 
dating back many decades). 
19
 Ramsay, supra note 33 at 495. 
20
 Axworthy, supra note 1 at 486–87 (listing six possible design modifications to control abuse by business); Gross, 
supra note 14 at 58–59. See generally, Christopher J Whelan, ed, Small Claims Courts: A Comparative Study, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) at 5 (describing courts in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England, 
Wales, Germany, and Japan) reviewed by E Thomas Garman, (1992) 26:1 J Cons Affairs 213–15.  
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Although specific features vary by jurisdiction, worldwide system re-design during the 
1970s produced some new design trends.
21
 The practice of setting a maximum monetary limit for 
eligible claims continued as before but in addition, some jurisdictions limited the subject matter 
of claims allowed to be filed, or restricted the type or entity of the litigant, the type of litigant 
representation, and/or the type of remedies available. Most jurisdictions applied some 
combination of all five of these strategies, and still regularly tinker with the mix today. Virtually 
every jurisdiction’s legislature sets (and regularly resets) the maximum monetary jurisdiction of 
the court to ensure only “small” disputes access the court, however, the definition of small varies 
widely.
22
 Also commonly applied was a restriction on the subject matter of the claims that could 
be heard in small claims court;
23
 for example family matters, construction liens, and workers 
compensation claims are examples of Ontario’s excluded subject matters.
24
  
Less often, controls applied to divert undesirable claims took the form of restricting the 
type of litigants based on the assumption that particular litigants commonly bring particular types 
of claims.
25
 Quebec, for example, restricts access by large or incorporated businesses and those 
parties represented by lawyers.
26
 Some jurisdictions combine or layer strategies, for example 
setting a lower monetary limit for particular claimants. California sets a lower monetary limit for 
business claims than for individuals.
27
 All of these design features were employed in varying 
degrees to empower the “people” over business. 
The focus and design of the Ontario Court similarly evolved from commercial resource 
for the marketplace to one of access to justice. In the 1970s the mandate was reframed around the 
now familiar pillars of access to justice—speed, low cost, informality, self-representation, and 
active adjudication.
28
 While other jurisdictions attempted to prevent complication of the 
simplified informal process by banning lawyers, refusing to apply the loser pays rule to costs, 
                                                 
21
 Gross, supra note 14 at 58–59 (describing trends in USA small claims court design after consumer advocacy). 
22
 See Shelley McGill, “The Evolution of Small Claims Court: Rising Monetary Limits and the Use of Legal 
Representation” (2015) 31 Windsor YB Acc Just 173 at 180 (across Canada limits range from $8,000 to $50,000 
CAD; much lower in the USA with median below $5,000 USD); Gross, supra note 14 at 57–58 (concluding USA 
limits rarely top $10,000 USD). 
23
 Defamation is often excluded: see e.g. Small Claims Court Act, RSBC 1996, c C430, s 3(2); The Court of Queen’s 
Bench Small Claims Practices Act, CCSM, c C285, s 3(4)(e). 
24
 Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F 3, s1(1) (defining court); Construction Lien Act, RSO 1990, c C 30, s 1(1); 
Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, SO 1997, c 16, s 26. 
25
 Businesses bring debt collection claims: see Shelley McGill, “Business Dominance in the People’s Court – An 
Empirical Assessment of Business Activity in the Toronto Small Claims Court” 33:1 Windsor YB Acc Just 
[forthcoming in 2017] (Holmes Cardozo Research Award finalist paper presented at 2015 Conference of the 
Academy of Legal Studies in Business, August 10, 2015 – Philadelphia, U.S.A). 
26
 Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ c C-25, art 953 (limits access of legal persons, partnerships, and associations with 
more than five employees to small claims court) New York City Civil Court Act §1809; Gross, supra note 14 at 58. 
27
 California Code of Civil Procedure, Title 1, c 5.5, §§ 116.220, 116.221; BC does the opposite and sets a different 
process for liquidated debts of higher value: Small Claims Rules, BC Reg 261/93, Rules 9.1 & 9.2; Manitoba sets a 
lower monetary limit for general damages ($2,000 v $10,000): The Court of Queen’s Bench Small Claims Practices 
Act, CCSM c C285 s 3(1). 
28
 Seana McGuire & Roderick MacDonald, “Small Claims Court Cant” (1996) 34:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 509 at 510. 
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and even shunning the business stakeholder,
29
 the Ontario court did not shrink from its debt 
collection responsibility. Unlike some other jurisdictions,
30
 subject matter restrictions were not 
incorporated into Ontario’s small claims court legislation but rather, any restrictions were 
introduced in the substantive subject matter specific legislation of the exempt topic by way of 
assigning exclusive jurisdiction to another court or tribunal.
31
 In this way, Ontario small claims 
court remained the catch basin for all disputes not expressly directed elsewhere.  
Even after the Ontario court was renamed the Small Claims Court in 1970 it did not 
restrict business access. It continued to permit lawyers to appear,
32
 to allow costs (although 
capped),
33
 and even acted as debt collector for other government tribunals and courts which 
lacked their own enforcement processes.
34
 Still, there was no question that business was no 
longer the only identified stakeholder. Over the subsequent years measures aimed at assisting 
individual users were put in place, such as fee waivers,
35
 fill in the blank forms,
36
 cost caps, 
mandatory settlement conferences,
37
 and even higher frequent user fees.
38
 The broad remedial 
power to “grant relief, redress or remedy, or combination of remedies, either absolute or 
conditional”
39
 enjoyed up to the 1970s was severely restricted in the 1980s. The power to grant 
equitable remedies was removed; going forward the Ontario court could order only monetary 
awards or the transfer of property.
40
 
                                                 
29
 Quebec: Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c C-25, art 959; Tariff of Court Fees applicable to the Recovery of Small 
Claims, CQLR c 25, r 16 higher fees for corporations than natural persons); Gross, supra note 14 at 58 (New York 
City also restricts access of business corporations). 
30
 See e.g. The Court of Queen’s Bench Small Claims Practices Act, CCSM c C285, ss 3(2), 3(4) (excluding family, 
defamation, and landlord-tenant matters). 
31
 See examples supra note 24. 
32
 Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, s 26. 
33
 Ibid at s 29 (capped at 15% of the amount claimed). 
34
 See e.g. Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 17, s 207. 
35
 Administration of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c A 6, ss 4.3, 4.4; O Reg 2/05; O Reg 675/05. 
36
 Rules of the Small Claims Court, O Reg 258/98, Table of Forms. 
37
 O Reg 78/06, s 27. 
38
 Ontario Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Regulations and Private Bills, “First Report on Regulation 
1999”, June 21, 2000, online: 
< ontla.on.ca/committee-proceedings/transcripts/files_html/2000-06-21_T016.htm#P8_1163> [perma.cc/F33W-
8ETP]. 
(Assistant Deputy Attorney General reporting that infrequent users are most commonly individuals or small 
businesses and the government wanted to provide them with an assurance of access to the court by giving them a 
smaller fee than frequent users. Frequent users are most commonly larger institutions, and in 1999 they actually 
formed less than 20% of the claims filed with the Small Claims Court in Ontario. The fees for infrequent users were 
established at a lower level to effectively increase the level of subsidy by government for individuals and for small 
businesses.) Grover, supra note 8 at para 47. See also Chief Justice Heather Smith, “Access to Justice: Ontario’s 
Overview of Two Approaches to Keeping Litigation Costs in Check” at 9 (Into the Future Conference – May 2006), 
online: < cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2006/smith-en.pdf> [perma.cc/S4FG-99HD]. 
39
 Small Claims Court Act, RSO 1980, c 476, s 59 (which continued “including the power to relieve penalties and 
forfeiture, in as full and ample a manner as might be done in the like case by the Supreme Court”) was repealed by 
the Courts of Justice Act, 1984, SO 1984, c 11, s 109(3) which stated that “[u]nless otherwise provided, only the 
Supreme Court, the District Court and the Unified Family Court may grant equitable relief”; Canada v Khimani 
(1985), 50 OR (2d) 476 at 481 (Div Ct). 
40
 Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, s 23, 96(3); Moore v Canadian Newspapers Co. [1989] OJ No 948 at 
para 14; at Grover, supra note 8 at paras 44, 47. 
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Small claims court’s new consumer mandate attracted public attention and spawned the 
label “People’s Court,” as well as a successful TV franchise that would eventually become an 
entire genre—the original reality TV. The People’s Court, with Judge Wapner (1981–1993), 
became an instant hit and has remained on the air in each of the four decades since.
41
 Other 
courtroom “reality” shows followed, with possibly the most successful incarnation being Judge 
Judy.
42
 This television “celebrity status” did not help the image of the Court—it was portrayed as 
a “ridiculous” forum where people bring odd trivial claims and cling to irrational positions. The 
New York Times described it as “campy, hammed up summary justice… [that] feeds the 
viewers’ vicarious craving for told-you-so retribution,”
43
 concluding that the TV portrayal “is 
Michael Moore populism, and the cumulative effect is depressing, a tableau of broken homes, 
bad luck and desperation snatched from ‘Miss Lonelyhearts’.”
44
 The harsh reactions of television 
judges made actual litigants more fearful than familiar with the real small claims court.
45
 In 
practice the court had little in common with its media made alter ego, and the fictitious rendering 
effectively trivialized the actual court’s function in the eyes of the public. 
 
B. AND BACK AGAIN 
 
Despite all of the access to justice reform measures implemented in the 1970s and 80s the actual 
work of the small claims court remained the same, primarily debt collection. The limited 
empirical work completed between the 1970s and the turn of the century consistently reported 
that business remained the highest volume user, pursing debt collection against primarily 
individual debtors.
46
 System designers in Canada were forced to address this necessary function 
and manage rather than deny it.  
Monetary limits became the tool of choice. Consumer friendly limits were originally set 
quite low ($400 in the 1970s), so that trivial matters would be the primary work of the court. 
However, since 2000 limits have risen at an accelerated pace, reaching $50,000 in Alberta as of 
                                                 
41
 People’s Court Website, online: <peoplescourt.com> [perma.cc/2PBH-S9RS].  
42
 With Judge Judy Sheindlin, online: < judgejudy.com> [perma.cc/N6CP-NRDB]. Sarah Palin will soon join the 
ranks of TV’s small claims court judges: Danielle Diaz, “Sarah Palin to host Reality Show as TV Judge” CNN.com, 
March 22, 2016, online: <cnn.com/2016/03/22/politics/sarah-palin-court-show-judge-judy/> [perma.cc/477N-
Z9H6]. 
43
 Alessandra Stanley, “Gavel to Gavel (To Gavel to Gavel) Coverage – TV’s Courts of Last Resort Hear Life’s 




 Michael Epstein, “Judging Judy, Mablean and Mills: How Courtroom Programs Use Law to Parade Private Lives 
to Mass Audiences” (2001) 8:2 UCLA Ent L Rev 129 at 138 (finding television programs bear little resemblance to 
actual courtrooms and television judges go out of their way to mock and shout a litigants); Steven Kohm, “The 
People’s Law versus Judge Judy Justice: Two Models of Law in American Reality-Based Courtroom TV” (2006) 
40:3 Law & Soc’y Rev 693 at 694–696; David B Rottman, Randall Hansen, Nicole Mott & Lynn Grimes, 
Perceptions of the Courts in Your Community: The Influence of Experience, Race and Ethnicity, Final Report to the 
National Centre for State Courts, (2003) at 9-10, online: <ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/201302.pdf> 
[perma.cc/DM5V-X94N]. 
46
 McGuire & MacDonald, supra note 28 at 514–515; Neil Vidmar, “The Small Claims Court: A 
Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical Investigation” (1984) 18:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 515 at 527–29. 
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2014.
47
 Non-monetary remedies remain rare in small claims court.
48
 Since the 1980s Ontario has 
restricted relief to monetary damages or return of property, specifically excluding equitable 
relief.
49
 The prevailing wisdom about restricted remedies relates to lower jeopardy and support 
for the proportional justice aspect of the simplified process.
50
 There is a constitutional 
complication for equitable relief in Ontario small claims courts arising from the nature of a 
statutory court and the appointment process of small claims court judges
51
—neither afford the 
court or its adjudicators with the inherent constitutional jurisdiction that would naturally flow to 
federally constituted courts organized under the Constitution Act 1867—the remedial power must 
emanate from the empowering provincial legislation.
52
 To date, the provincial will has been 
lacking. 
Over the last decade the court has returned to its economic and commercial roots. 
Canadian provinces, including Ontario, are revitalizing small claims court’s debt collection 
function. Rather than restricting access, they are offering new and more efficient ways to process 
debt collection claims. British Columbia was the first to provide a liquidated damage track in 
2007, where financial debts could be proven in a fast tracked process.
53
 Ontario expedited debt 
collection claims by allowing clerks to sign judgment for undefended liquidated damage claims
54
 
without judicial oversight, and in 2015 Ontario introduced online filing and electronic default 
judgments for only liquidated debts.
55
  
Reform of debt collection processes is not the only change that has taken place in 
Ontario’s Small Claims Court since the turn of the century. Although little in the court’s forgoing 
history suggests a pre-planned adoption of a substantive social policy mandate, over time more 
and more causes of action with social policy aspects have been added to the court’s existing 
jurisdiction by both the legislature and the courts. The addition of privacy, discrimination, and 
parental responsibility to existing causes of action
56
 make the court’s social policy mandate 
                                                 
47
 A Reg 139/14. Ontario’s limit history: Small Claims Court Act RSO 1970, c 439, s 5 ($400); Small Claims Court 
Amendment Act, SO 1977, c 52 (increasing to $1000 in 1977); Small Claims Court Jurisdiction Regulation (Courts 
of Justice Act) O Reg 92/93 (increasing limit to $6000 in 1993); Small Claims Court Jurisdiction and Appeal Limit 
Regulation, O Reg 626/00 as amen O Reg 439/08 (raising limit to $10,000 in 2001 and to $25,000 effective 1 
January 2010). 
48
 Manitoba Law Reform Commission, supra note 5 at 31, 34–35, recommending the Manitoba Court be empowered 
to grant equitable relief but acknowledging potential conflict with Constitution Act, 1867, s 96; British Columbia 
allows the equitable remedy of specific performance: Small Claims Court Act, RSBC 1996, c C430, s 3(1). 
49
 Supra note 39; Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43, ss 11(2), 23, 96(3). 
50
 O Reg 258/98, supra note 36, Rule 1.03(1) (articulates the proportional justice aspect of the rules by requiring 
their interpretation “to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every proceeding on its 
merits”). 
51
 Almost all small claims court adjudication is done by part-time deputy judges who are appointed to successive 
three year terms, pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c 34, s 32. 
52
 Grover, supra note 8 at paras 15–16; Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43, s 11(2). 
53
 Small Claims Rules, BC Reg 261/93 as amended by BC Reg 360/07 (enacting Rule 9.2, Summary Trial for 
Financial Debt). 
54
 O Reg 258/98, Rule 11.02. 
55
Ibid, Rule 7.02 (e-filing just applied to debt collection when introduced and has since been expanded). 
56
 Supra note 11. 
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undeniable. The overwhelming proportion of debt collection claims
57
 and the trivialization of the 
court’s image by the media have hidden this expanding social purpose from view.  
At first glance, given its simplified procedure and lack of authority to grant declaratory or 
injunctive relief, the small claims court appears ill-suited for litigation of social issues where 
behaviour modification remedies are often ordered.
58
 However, the expanding availability of 
damages as a remedy to address social issues through civil causes of action has reduced small 
claims court’s apparent remedial obstacle and opened its doors to emerging social issues. Small 
claims court’s informality and small monetary jeopardy create a low risk vehicle to implement 
social policy at the grassroots level, as demonstrated in the following examples of civil causes of 
action involving parental responsibility, discrimination, and privacy. 
 
II. THE SOCIAL POLICY MANDATE 
 
Social policy is society’s response to need and discontent—most typically in the form of 
government policy designed to maximize people’s wellbeing and address the social ills of the 
time.
59
 The word “policy” refers to the principles that drive action towards a particular end; it 
relates to both the means and the ends and necessarily implies changing situations, systems, 
practices, or behaviours.
60




Although family services, child protection, and human rights have long been social policy 
priorities, with the new millennium, personal, informational, and territorial privacy
62
 have also 
become high societal priorities under serious threat from the digital world. Child protection, 
human rights, and privacy are the subject of federal and/or provincial government regulation in 
the form of legislation and administrative agencies charged with the responsibility for 
enforcement and oversight.
63
 However, social change may also be affected by empowering those 
disadvantaged by the social ill and allowing them to take action themselves.
64
 The benefit of 
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 McGill, supra note 25. 
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 Effectiveness of the remedy has been a barrier to cases under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: see R v Dunn 
(1996) 31 OR (3d) 540; Parkin v Peel (Regional Municipality) Police Service Board, [2012] OJ No 3170. 
59
 José G Vargas-Hernández, Mohammad Reza Noruzi, Farhad Nezhad Haj Ali Irani, “What is Policy, Social Policy 
and Social Policy Changing?” (2011) 2:10 Intl J Business & Social Science 287. 
60
 Richard M Titmuss, “What is Social Policy?” in Stephen Leibfried & Steffen Mau, eds, Welfare States: 
Construction, Deconstruction and Reconstruction, vol 1 (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2008) 
89 at 137. 
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 Ibid at 144 (includes some element of moral progress). 
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 Three aspects of privacy (although not mutually exclusive) are discussed in R v Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417; R v 
Tessling, [2004] 3 SCR 432; R v Gamboc, 2010 SCJ No 55; R v Spence, 2014 SCC 43. 
63
 As to child protection see Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C 11, ss 15–20.2 (establishing Children’s 
Aid Societies); as to human rights see Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19, ss 27–31.7 (establishing the Ontario 
Human Rights Commission); as to privacy see Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c 
F 18, s 4 (establishing the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario). 
64
 Duncan Green, “The Role of the State in Empowering Poor and Excluded Groups and Individuals” (Paper 
delivered at the Expert Group Meeting on Policies and Strategies to Promote Empowerment of People in Achieving 
Poverty Eradication, Social Integration and Full Employment and Decent Work For All organized by the Division 
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individual empowerment is twofold—at the same time, affected individuals are “enhancing their 
own sense of agency and making the structural changes to institutions and policies that are 
needed for their emancipation.”
65
 In this light, the small claims court has an obvious social 
policy contribution to make as a venue that empowers self-represented litigants to take action on 
their own in a way that higher level courts do not. The civil cause of action is an ideal tool to 
achieve social change through individual empowerment by authorizing the injured party to take 
action against the social ill that has harmed him or her, rather than depending upon (or waiting 
for) a government agency to act on a complaint. The following three examples of civil causes of 
action with social policy implications expressly or implicitly identify the Ontario Small Claims 
Court as the forum of choice. 
Of course, social policy is at the heart of the procedural access to justice mission of the 
court—making quick, easy, affordable dispute resolution more available to the general public, 
particularly poor and disenfranchised members of society, is itself a social purpose targeting 
procedural barriers. But this access to justice policy is distinguishable as a procedural, rather than 
substantive, application of social policy goals. The failure to displace either the dominant 
business plaintiff or the trivialized media image makes the court’s access to justice context a 
poor example of social policy in action. One can hope for better in the substantive context. 
 
A. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
What could be more fundamental to a healthy society and the welfare of citizens than the safety 
of its children?
66
 Child protection necessarily invokes the responsibility of a parent to supervise 
their child. “It’s 11:00 o’clock. Do you know where your children are?” Many Ontarian’s 
recognize this question as one that a Buffalo TV station
67
 asks each night at the beginning of its 
late news broadcast but few Ontarians realize that it is also a question asked in Ontario Small 
Claims Court. 
Historically, Ontario parents have not been held vicariously (or strictly) liable for torts 
committed by their children.
68
 Some form of negligence on the parents’ part is typically required 
to be proven before parents are responsible for compensating those damaged by actions of their 
children and the burden of proof in negligence actions is usually on the plaintiff.
69
 In 2000 this 
changed for Ontario parents when the Parental Responsibility Act, 2000 (PRA) was proclaimed 
                                                                                                                                                             
for Social Policy and Development of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York 
City, 10––11 September 2013), online: 
 <un.org/esa/socdev/egms/docs/2013/EmpowermentPolicies/Background%20Paper.pdf> [perma.cc/Q385-YEDZ]. 
65
 Ibid at 1. 
66
 Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F 3, Preamble (acknowledging the important role of family in society). 
67
 The campaign has been attributed to Mel Epstein, Director of On-Air Promotions at New York's WNEW-TV by 
Kovalchik, Kara. "The Origin of "It's 10 PM. Do You Know Where Your Children Are?" online: 
<mentalfloss.com/article/30945/origin-its-10-pm-do-you-know-where-your-children-are> [perma.cc/7DER-8RSX] 
TIME Magazine, Top Ten Public Service Announcements, online: 
 <content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1920454_1920455_1920452,00.html> 
[perma.cc/W2MV-TZ5J] (Number 7 of 10). 
68
 Causey et al v McCarron et al, [1968] 67 DLR (2d) 707 at para 6 (BCCA). 
69
 Ibid. See also Gu (Litigation Guardian of) v Friesen, [2013] BCJ No 686 at para 29 (BCSC). 
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in force, introducing a new statutory civil cause of action against parents for property damaged 
caused by their children. The PRA expressly designated the Small Claims Court as the forum.
70
  
This statute shifted the burden of proof from plaintiffs to defendants and imposed liability 
on parents for intentional property damage or loss caused by their children. The parents could 
avoid liability if they proved that they had not been negligent in the supervision of their 
children.
71
 This was a monumental change in the Ontario government’s expectation of parents—
essentially requiring proof of “satisfactory parenting” to avoid liability for intentional property 
damage by children thereby potentially promoting greater parental supervision of their children.  
Theoretically, the PRA’s shifted burden of proof should make it far easier to find parents 
liable for children’s actions. The legislation provides a list of factors relevant to the 
determination of reasonable supervision to aid deputy judges when deciding if parents have met 
their societal duty of reasonable supervision; this is among the few statutory definitions of good 
parenting to be attempted by a legislature. The court’s monetary cap on damages of $25,000 and 
the cause of action’s application to only intentional property damage confine the court’s potential 
impact on social change. Still, the deliberate customization of a statutory cause of action for 
Small Claims Court demonstrates a legislative intent to implement social policy (and change) 
through the simplified process of small claims court.  
To date there are no reported cases
72
 from small claims court that impose liability on 
parents under the PRA’s statutory cause of action; indeed all attempts to do so have failed. The 
reported cases deal with property damage arising from motor vehicle accidents involving 
unlicensed minor drivers. In both Shannon v TW
73
 and Cinnirella v CC
74
 the court found that the 
parent defendants met the burden of establishing reasonable supervision when leaving 
supervision of teenage children to older siblings—the reasonableness, not perfection, of the 
parenting standard was emphasized. It should be noted that both of these reported cases involved 
parties represented by counsel,
75
 who would be more familiar with the available causes of action 
and likely more prepared for a shifted burden of proof than a self-represented litigant. For the 
purposes of this paper the outcome of any reported case is less important than the availability of 
the cause of action, as it signals the Ontario Legislature’s expanded view of the court’s role in 
implementing social policy.  
 
  
                                                 
70
 Parental Responsibility Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 4, s 2 (proclaimed in force 15 August 2000). 
71
 Ibid at s 2(2) (the parent must prove reasonable supervision and reasonable effort to prevent or discourage the 
activity). 
72
 This does not mean liability has never been imposed; only written judgments are eligible for reporting and written 
reserve judgments are uncommon in Ontario Small Claims Court. One other reported case considered the 
Meadowlarke Stables v Lucas, [2008] OJ No 5565 (finding that the Parental Responsibility Act did not apply to a 
breach of contract action for expenses arising from a lease of a horse by a parent for a child). 
73
 [2002] OJ No 2339. 
74
 [2004] OJ No 3007. 
75
 Motor vehicle accidents typically involve subrogated claims by insurance companies who have counsel, as was 
the situation in both of these cases. 
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B. DISCRIMINATION 
 
The Canadian common law does not yet recognize an independent tort of discrimination.
76
 
Human rights violations in the private sector are managed under provincial human rights codes 
and the Supreme Court of Canada has held that victims of discrimination must find their relief in 
the statutory remedies available under the respective provincial human rights legislation.
77
 Up 
until 2006, this meant that the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (OHRT) was the exclusive forum 
for those Ontarians seeking damages for discrimination in housing, employment, and other 
private sector activities included in the Code. The Ontario Small Claims Court dismissed claims 
brought before it when plaintiffs sought remedies for only discrimination.
78
  
All this changed when the Ontario Legislature enacted section 46.1 of the Ontario Human 
Rights Code (OHRC) in 2006.
79
 This section allows damages for discrimination and harassment 
to be claimed in any court action provided that they are combined with an existing common law 
cause of action. Natural contenders for combination are defamation and wrongful dismissal, both 
relatively popular small claims court topics.
80
 The introduction of section 46.1 effectively ended 
the OHRT’s monopoly on private sector discrimination relief and opened all courtroom doors. 
The important aspect of section 46.1 for the Small Claims Court is the expanded type of 
compensable damages that may be ordered; these are much wider than typical mental distress 
damages
81
 previously acknowledged in tort or wrongful dismissal claims. Small claims court 
litigants rarely submit the type of expert medical evidence needed to satisfy mental distress 
requirements,
82
 but less expert evidence of humiliation and hurt feelings, now compensable 
under section 46.1, is widely available to small claims court litigants.
83
 Injury to dignity and self-
respect are also compensable under section 46.1, not typically considered medical injuries and 
valuation may be in the same range of the non-pecuniary privacy damages that are discussed in 
the next section of this paper. The outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct is also relevant to 
the assessment of section 46.1 damages. 
To date, in the Small Claims Court, breach of the Code damages are most often attached 
to wrongful dismissal cases. This was even attempted (with some success) before the section 
46.1 amendment. In Fanous v Total Credit Recovery Ltd.
84
 a constructive dismissal action 
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84
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including damages for sexual harassment was successful because the plaintiff proved that 
compliance with the Human Rights Code was a term of the contract, breach of which triggered 
the right to traditional breach of contract damages. Following the introduction of section 46.1 the 
damage claims have proceeded more easily. In Bray v Canadian College of Massage and 
Hydrotherapy,
85
 the court allowed $20,000 of damages under section 46.1 for “hurt feelings” 
after the plaintiff was constructively dismissed after a maternity leave. Damages of $15,000 were 




Breach of Code damages are also being attached to small claims court housing related 
cases. A landlord and tenant dispute and even an aborted real estate purchase have successfully 
attached breach of Code damages.
87
 In Friman v Toledo Estates Ltd. breach of Code damages 
were awarded as part of a misrepresentation claim associated with the purchase of a 
condominium unit. The availability of handicapped parking spaces required by the plaintiff was 
misrepresented and triggered damages for failure to accommodate. It seems there is overlap of 
subject matters between small claims court and human rights code cases, making the court a 




In the age of social media, electronic surveillance, and Edward Snowden,
88
 privacy may be the 
most challenging social issue of our time. In Canada, it is a fundamental human right protected 
from unreasonable government intrusion by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
89
 For private 
sector intrusion, legislation has been enacted across the country,
90
 including the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) which is the primary piece of 
federal legislation regulating privacy standards in the private sector.
91
 However, the Canadian 
common law has been slow to recognize an independent tort of invasion of privacy.
92
 It took 
until 2012 for the Ontario Court of Appeal to create the first invasion of privacy tort, intrusion 
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and Access Act, SNB 2009, c P-7.05; Personal Health Information Act, SNL 2008, c P-7.01. 
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 SC 2000, c 5. 
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Partitions Inc v Ashcor Implantm Structures Ltd., [1993] OJ No 4685 (awarding damages for harassing telephone 
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upon seclusion.
93
 When it did, the small claims court figured prominently in its configuration. 
Intrusion on seclusion occurs when reckless or intentional conduct of the defendant invades the 
private affairs or concerns of the plaintiff without legal justification and a reasonable person 
would find the invasion “highly offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish.”
94
 When 
establishing this tort in Jones v Tsige, Justice Robert Sharpe acknowledged its social policy 
implications: 
 
Recognition of such a cause of action [intrusion upon seclusion] would amount to an 
incremental step that is consistent with the role of this court to develop the common 




The small claims court’s role is pivotal in this new tort because proof of actual harm is not an 
element of the tort. Given the intangible nature of the privacy interest, damages will typically be 
for a “modest conventional sum.”
96
 Small claims court is by definition the forum for modest 
sums. Justice Sharpe goes further and expressly sets a range for non-pecuniary damages which is 
below the $25,000 limit of the Ontario Small Claims Court:  
 
In my view, damages for intrusion upon seclusion in cases where the plaintiff has 
suffered no pecuniary loss should be modest but sufficient to mark the wrong that has 
been done. I would fix the range at up to $20,000…. absent truly exceptional 




In effect, Sharpe JA implicitly assigns small claims court the delicate responsibility of valuing 
the intangible loss of privacy when no pecuniary loss occurs.
98
 In practice, typical damage 
awards for minor cases involving the new tort are around $7500,
99
 well below the small claims 
limit.
100
 This reality will direct privacy breaches into small claims court as there are negative cost 
consequences for parties who bring claims in superior court that ultimately net judgment within 
the small claims court monetary jurisdiction.
101
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The high volume of debt collection matters in small claims court is an obvious 
opportunity for the new invasion of privacy torts. An overwhelming majority of small claims 
court cases involve unpaid contractual debts, where impoverished debtors have few legal 
defences but their financial inability to pay the debt does not deter the aggressive creditor.
102
 
Aggressive debt collection practices were brought into issue by the defendant in a defaulted 
motor vehicle lease claim when the defendant countered with an intrusion upon seclusion action 
arising from collection phone messages. In Action Auto Leasing & Gallery Inc. v Gray, the 
defendants were allowed a nominal $100 for intrusion upon seclusion.
103
 In Connolly v Telus 
Communications Co.,
104
 the alleged misuse of the plaintiff’s credit information was in issue 
although the evidence did not establish the elements of the tort. Intrusive debt collection calls 
were also at issue in Yim v Rogers Communication Partnership.
105
 It seems savvy debtors are 
beginning to claim intrusion on seclusion when sued for outstanding debts, which has the 




Importantly, the court has also been asked to weigh in on cases where privacy is at the 
core of the dispute. In Vertolli v You Tube LLC,
107
 the plaintiff commenced an action claiming 
damages arising from the posting of a video on You Tube, both the poster and the host (You 
Tube) were named as defendants. You Tube’s motion to dismiss the claim was denied and the 
action was allowed to proceed. In Halley v McCann, the disclosure of health care information to 
those outside the plaintiff’s circle of care was the issue in dispute between the parties.
108
 
By setting the range of non-pecuniary damages below the maximum small claims court 
limit, the Court of Appeal has indirectly designated the small claims court as the forum for 
quantifying societal discontent with privacy violations. But this is not too suggest that invasion 
of privacy is within the exclusion jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. In the latest case 
advancing Ontario privacy law,
109
 the Ontario Superior Court expanded on the range for non-
pecuniary damages. Justice David Stinson commented on Justice Sharpe’s earlier direction on 
valuation when awarding $50,000 saying, 
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I am alert to the relatively modest ($10,000) award in Jones v. Tsige, and the 
cautionary comments of the Court of Appeal concerning claims for intrusion on 
privacy of the sort that formed the basis for the plaintiff’s claim in that case. That 
was a much different situation, however: while it, too, was a case involving “invasion 
of privacy,” the privacy right offended and the consequences to the plaintiff there 
were vastly less serious and offensive than the present case. For the reasons 
previously mentioned, this case involves much more than an invasion of a right to 
informational privacy; as I have observed, in many ways it is analogous to a sexual 
assault. Given the circumstances of this case, and in particular the impact of the 




It is unlikely that this expanded range will deter small claims court cases; small claims litigants 
are known to abandon modest excess over the monetary limit in order to remain within the low 
cost, simplified process. 
Punitive damages, designed to punish and deter bad behaviour of defendants, sometimes 
have a role to play in privacy and discrimination cases.
111
 They are available in small claims 
court although they are rare.
112
 They may have been the remedy applied to harassing debt 
collectors or in malicious defamation before intrusion on seclusion provided a more exacting 
head of damage that requires less proof of malicious, deliberately wrongful conduct. In this way, 
the new invasion of privacy tort with its expanded range of damage extends the existing 
remedies available to small claims court litigants. However, apologies and injunctions that would 
directly address the subject behaviour and require immediate modification have been and remain 
outside the reach of the Ontario Small Claims Court. 
 
III. CHALLENGES  
 
The forgoing social policy examples demonstrate judicial and legislative intent to use small 
claims court to effect social change. However, there are challenges that may limit the court’s 
effectiveness and most of these involve the core tenets of access to justice—low, quick, easy, and 
summary dispute resolution. Only modest changes can be implemented without compromising 
the simplified process itself. 
 
A. PUBLIC AWARENESS 
 
The most obvious challenge to fulfilling the social policy mandate is a lack of public awareness. 
Few stakeholders seem familiar with this function of the court. The court’s stereotype as a forum 
for the trivial and ridiculous perpetuated in the media is a distraction for those seeking a venue to 
                                                 
110
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111
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address serious societal ills. Very few reported cases
113
 on the Parental Responsibility Act—
enacted 15 years ago—may reflect the lack of awareness of both the existence of the statutory 
cause of action and the availability of small claims court to hear such disputes. The much higher 
proportion of intrusion upon seclusion decisions reported in the three years
114
 following its 
creation could signal progress in this regard and growing awareness of the broader social policy 
role of the court. But reported cases are a poor indicator of actual usage when dealing with Small 
Claims Court because most never go to trial
115
 and only a small percentage of cases that actually 
go to trial result in reported reasons. 
The proportion of issued claims (rather than reported decisions) would present a much 
more reliable picture of actual awareness. Available statistics on subject matter do not isolate 
these specific causes of actions but do reveal that over 85% of all claims issued deal with some 
type of contract dispute;
116
 only 10% of all issued claims involve tort claims,
117
 almost equally 
divided between personal injury claims and those claiming property damage only. It seems 
obvious that invasion of privacy torts would make up only a very small percentage of the 
personal injury claims and negligent parental supervision would contribute an even smaller 
number to property damage claims.  
Party entity statistics reporting the very pronounced dominance of the business 
plaintiff
118
 suggest that small claims court may have already lost touch with the individual 
plaintiffs targeted by these social policy types of civil causes of action. Efforts to re-engage this 
constituency have done little to alter this reality over recent years.
119
 Currently the court’s image 
as debt collector for business plaintiffs overshadows all other aspects of its work. 
 
B. SIMPLIFIED PROCESS 
 
The court’s simplified process, praised by access to justice advocates, offers natural advantages 
including speedy trials and reduced formality; however, this same simplified process presents 
obstacles to fulfilling the social policy mandate. Discovery does not exist—a party need only 
produce documents that the party intends to rely upon, and no discovery of witnesses is 
available.
120
 Therefore, finding the evidence to prove a small claims court case can be a problem. 
As well and as noted above, summary trials are typically decided by oral reasons from the bench 
that go no further than the parties themselves and remain unreported. Even when written reasons 
are reported there is little precedential value to a reported decision from small claims court. Class 
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actions do not exist in small claims court,
121
 so individual plaintiffs must process their own 
claims no matter how many similar claims exist or how minor the damages. In sum, a small 
claims court decision has (at least initially) individual rather than mass application. 
 The self-representation aspect of the court is a core tenet of the simplified process but for 
social policy purposes it may be a liability. Even if a potential litigant is aware of the cause of 
action, preparing cases involving these three areas of the law takes particular legal knowledge. 
For example, the reverse onus of the parental responsibility cause of action means that the parent 
must bring their own evidence of supervision and that of the objective reasonable standard. It 
would be logical for parent defendants to believe the plaintiff would have to prove they did 
something “wrong.” Similarly, the nuances of the invasion of privacy torts require specific 
evidence.  
The failure of a plaintiff to expressly label the cause of action or defence is not fatal in 
small claims court. Under the interventionist judicial style
122
 common in small claims court, 
judges can attach the proper label to facts proven as was done in Vertolli v You Tube.
123
 
However, there is a limit.
124
 Judicial activism cannot find evidence where none is offered. 
Success or failure may turn more frequently in small claims court on a lack of evidence and the 
placement of the burden of proof (as opposed to substantive assessment on the merits) than it 
does in other forums where lawyers are common.
125
  
The small claims court adjudicator is a part-time generalist.
126
 Traditional forums for 
privacy, discrimination, and parental responsibility disputes involve full time specialist decision 
makers through the privacy commissioner office, the human rights tribunal, and the provincial 
family court respectively. Lack of substantive familiarity may limit the small claims court 
judge’s ability to fill in the gaps for the unrepresented litigant.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to debate the effectiveness of changing social 
behaviour through civil litigation generally; however it is acknowledged that there are limits to 
any court’s effectiveness in this area, not to mention small claims court. Litigation is reactive 
rather than proactive. Preventative avenues such as educational campaigns must be maintained. 
As well, courts are public forums, the details of discrimination and invasion of privacy are often 
sensitive and the victims may be among the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of 
society. Victims may not want a public resolution, preferring a private dispute resolution 
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 Litigation is expensive; even small claims court applies the loser pays rule in 
Ontario.
128
 Cost awards (although capped and discretionary)
129
 are a real concern for 
impoverished litigants. Even though waivers of court fees are available for qualifying parties,
130
 
this does not protect a losing party from adverse cost awards. 
  Most of the forgoing limitations are offset by the multi-faceted approach to social policy 
implementation—as long as small claims court is only one of multiple avenues used to promote 
social change, the simplified process adds value to the overall social policy strategy.
131
 Nothing 
in the small claims court’s social policy mandate excludes access to the more specialized forums 
if preferred by the victim and it is not recommended that the core tenets of the simplified process 
be unraveled to better accommodate the social policy function.  
 
C. REMEDIES – THE CASE FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF 
 
The one area where change could be made without detracting from the access to justice mission 
of the court is remedies. Equitable remedies would enhance the social policy mandate, 
particularly for invasion of privacy and discrimination actions. Currently the court is only able to 
award damages or transfer property, not grant equitable remedies such as injunctions or 
declarations, despite calls for expansion.
132
 The court lacks the power to order the defendant to 
apologize, to stop the offending behaviour, or to stop distributing the private facts or 
information.
133
 Imagine the dismay of a plaintiff who wins an invasion of privacy action arising 
from an offensive picture on a website and still cannot obtain a court order requiring the 
defendant to take it off his or her site. These are limitations already encountered in managing 
defamation remedies. The age old justifications relating to equitable remedies can be debated 
here
134
 but the reality is that the court’s impact on social change is limited without the power to 
alter behaviour. 
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Perhaps modified equitable relief tied to the damage award is the answer. Authority for 
the court to increase damages if the offending action (or inaction) is not modified could incentify 
a change in behaviour. This type of remedy exists for the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Board—
the specialized tribunal for residential landlord and tenant disputes with exactly the same 
monetary jurisdiction as the Ontario Small Claims Court.
135
 The Board has the authority to 
terminate a tenancy on a particular date and order compensation to the landlord.
136
 The Board 
also routinely sets a per diem to be added to the compensation for every day that the tenant 
remains in occupation after the ordered termination date.
137
 Why not allow a small claims court 
judgment to include the same type of per diem? It could set damages for an invasion of privacy 
or defamation up to the date of the judgment and then assign a per diem amount for every day 
the conduct continues after release of the judgment. This would save the plaintiff from having to 
bring a second action for the additional damages suffered after trial and incentify behaviour 
modification.  
Critics may be concerned that such a post judgment per diem could cause the value of the 
judgment to rise above the monetary limit of the court. However, this already occurs with the 
accrual of post judgment interest. Many small claims court judgments are worth more than 
$25,000 when post judgment interest is included. Debt collection actions that set a contractual 
rate of interest exceeding 20% per annum are common for credit card debts and the court allows 
post judgment interest to run indefinitely.
138
 A $20,000 judgment quickly exceeds $25,000 when 
a 29.9% per annum post judgment interest rate runs for a few years. If the critics insist, the post 
judgment accrual could be capped at the monetary limit.  
Therefore, the current remedial challenge could be overcome with the following 
amendment to the rules: 
 
(1) If the court finds that a party will continue to suffer damage after judgment as a result of 
ongoing behaviour of the at fault party, a post judgment per diem amount may be awarded to 
compensate for the continuing damage.  
(2) Unless an earlier date is identified in the judgment, post judgment per diem compensation 
shall continue to accrue until the at fault party discontinues the identified behaviour or the total 
judgment damage award plus the post judgment accrued per diem amount, exclusive of interest, 
reaches the maximum monetary jurisdiction of the court, which ever shall first occur. 
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Other jurisdictions have granted their small claims courts limited authority to grant equitable 
relief. British Columbia and New York City both allow the specific performance remedy.
139
 
California allows equitable relief in limited circumstances when “a statute expressly authorizes 
the small claims court to grant equitable relief.”
140
 There are a range of available solutions that 
would not amount to unfettered authority to grant equitable relief in all cases and yet remove the 
current moratorium. 
 
D. ADDRESSING CHALLENGES 
 
To have a meaningful social change impact, the small claims court forum requires some minor 
modifications and the expansion of remedies may be the easiest one. It involves only a rules 
change. Awareness and preparedness will require more nuanced efforts. It is highly unlikely that 
the television media will reform its presentation of the court to include this more serious side. 
Although increased involvement of lawyers and to some extent paralegals could reduce both the 
awareness and preparedness obstacles, increased legal representation is not the recommendation 
of this paper. To depart from one of the fundamental pillars of the simplified process by 
encouraging legal representation would undermine the primary functions of the court. Therefore, 
litigants must be able to find the necessary information and support within the existing process. 
The solution may be the settlement conference. Ontario’s process incorporates a mandatory 
settlement conference prior to trial for all defended actions and this presents an opportunity. The 
settlement conference could be the resource to supply necessary information with its interactive 
and less evaluative environment. Judges holding these informal sessions could take an instructive 
approach to advising litigants about the elements of the social policy causes of action and the 
required evidence. Again critics may fear the loss of neutrality or impartiality that may occur if a 
judge advises a litigant to add an unknown cause of action thereby worsening the position of the 
opposing party. However, settlement conference judges do not hear any eventual trial and 
already comment on the strength of the evidence and instruct parties to amend pleadings in order 
the assist parties in effective preparation for trial
141
—the recommended approach to the social 
policy mandate would be in keeping with the existing role. 
Going forward, the primary challenges can be overcome by equipping the court with 
necessary remedial power and incorporating awareness initiatives into the settlement conference 
in the hope that the public will widen its view of the court and the social policy mandate will 




Individually, the introduction of parental responsibility, privacy and discrimination, to the 
jurisdiction of the Ontario Small Claims Court went virtually unnoticed. Even viewed 
collectively, they amount to a negligible proportion of the court’s caseload. Still their addition to 
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the range of topics considered in small claims court marks a profound shift in the mandate of the 
court. The court’s reach and influence now extends to key social issues of the day and is no 
longer confined to the mercantile, trivial or insignificant. The expanded mandate developed by a 
combination of legislative design and judicial activism is a reality and the simplified process 
must adapt to fulfil its potential. 
Unfortunately, this little known aspect of the Court’s work is underutilized and the 
existing process is ill-prepared to meet its ever expanding social change responsibility. Authority 
to grant limited equitable relief would improve the Court’s ability to deal with the social change 
aspects of the new civil causes of action. As long as the Small Claims Court remains trapped 
between the stereotypes of debt collection and media reality show, few will benefit from the 
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